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WINNING THE RISKY GLOBAL BusINESS GAME: PARRYING
THE THRUSTS OF TERRORISM WITH AN INTERNATIONAL
INSURANCE COALITION
In this era of heightened nationalism and patriotism both in the United
States and abroad, as well as of global economic downturn, people need to
guard against the antiglobalization tendencies, which have previously led
the world community to protectionism and war, and reaffirm instead
shared cosmopolitan values as "citizens of the world." From such shared
values come not only a shared prosperity, but also sustainable peace.'
INTRODUCTION
In response to the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001, the George W. Bush administration,2 specifically, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Robert Zoellick, advocated that trade is precisely the way to com-
bat terrorism.' In support of this theory, the United States Congress granted
President Bush "fast track" or "trade promotion authority" so he could nego-
tiate trade agreements that Congress may only approve or disapprove, but
not modify." In November 2001 at the Doha, Qatar round, member nations of
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") began negotiations to lower even
1. Linda Lim, Keynote Address: Terrorism and Globalization: An International Perspec-
tive, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 710 (2002).
2. George W. Bush was sworn in as the 43r President of the United States on January 20,
2001. The White House, President George W. Bush, available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/president/gwbbio.html (last visited on Nov. 12, 2003).
3. See Robert B. Zoellick, Remarks at the National Press Club, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/zoellick_26-npc.PDF (Oct. 1, 2002). "America's
strategy to promote a more secure world recognizes the ties of free trade and free societies...
[and] [o]ur campaign against [terrorists] ... should employ economic and trade policies to
underpin America's long-term security." Id.
4. See John F. Murphy, The Impact of Terrorism on Globalisation and Vice Versa, 36
INT'L LAW 77, 81 (2002). One of the House of Representatives' justifications for passing the
bill is that promotion of trade is integral to the fight against terrorism. Id. at 81 n.39 (citing
Jon E. Hilsenrath, Globalization Persists In Precarious New Age, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2001,
at A1).
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more trade barriers.' One of the expressed concerns during the negotiations
was the threat of the events of September I 1" on trade flows."
To successfully pursue this public commitment to combat terrorism
through international trade and business, multinational companies
("MNCs")7 require terrorism insurance to protect their interests. However,
following September 1 1" insurance companies either significantly increased
their rates for terrorism insurance or were completely unwilling to insure ter-
rorism risks.8 If MNCs do not insure against terrorism and leave their busi-
ness interests at risk, how will it effect the promotion of international busi-
ness and trade?
As a leader of globalization, the U.S. has been encouraging the har-
monization of political, economic, social and cultural philosophies and prac-
tices by signing trade agreements and promoting U.S. exports of goods, ser-
vices and manufacturing facilities.9 MNCs, in addition to adhering to both
the U.S.' and the host country's requirements for regulatory compliance,
must also obtain insurance to protect their investments and activities. Glob-
alization, along with the economic benefits it has bestowed on both devel-
oped and developing economies through the facilitated movement of goods,
people, ideas and technology with minimal governmental interference,"° has
also facilitated the globalization of terrorism." Though terrorism owes its
success to globalization, it also works as a force to prevent it. 2 One way to
continue the globalization process while guarding against terrorism is to in-
sure terrorism risks. However, the difficulty in calculating terrorism risks
causes high-priced premiums or hinders availability of coverage. 3
Part I of this comment defines globalization for the purpose of under-
standing global insurance needs and describes the effect of terrorism on
5. See WTO Ministerial Declaration (adopted Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http:lwww.wto.org/english/thewto-elminist_e/min0l_e/mindecle.htm.
6. See Mike Moore, Preparations for the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spmm-e/spmn72_e.htm (Oct. 9, 2001).
7. MNCs include corporations that are connected to foreign markets through product
sales, international contracts or foreign direct investment. Linda A. Mabry, Multinational
Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the Concept of Corporate Nationality,
87 GEO. L.J. 563, 567-68 (1999) (examining the relationship between globalization and na-
tionalism and advocating an "economic commitment" test that studies a corporation's struc-
ture, organization and operations to determine a corporation's national identity).
8. See Spinner, infra note 47.
9. See Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 429, 430, 432-33 (1997) (proposing that globalization should be embraced because of the
potential it has to de-emphasize factors that cause divisions among human beings such as
race, religion and ethnicity).
10. See, e.g., Teresa Edwards, Comment, The Relocation of Production and Effects on
the Global Community, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 185 (2002) (explaining
globalization in the context of environmental regulations).
11. John B. Attanasio & Don S. DeAmicis, Foreword: The Limits of Globalization?, 36
INT'L LAw. 1 (2002).
12. Id.
13. See Patterson, infra note 127.
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globalization. Part II focuses on the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
and the impact it will have on U.S.-based MNCs pursuing business interests
abroad. It also explains the legislative and corporate responses of other coun-
tries that provide terrorism insurance. Part III describes the various unilateral
responses to provide terrorism insurance. The article ultimately posits that an
international arrangement, rather than several unilateral endeavors, will most
effectively insure terrorism risks for MNCs conducting international busi-
ness and trade.
I. THE EFFECT OF TERRORISM ON GLOBALIZATION
A. Defining Globalization in the Context of Global Insurance Needs
Generally, globalization is the movement of goods, services, capital, in-
formation, ideas and people around the world."' It has helped integrate do-
mestic markets to the international arena through evolutions in international
communication, global transportation, information technology and dissolu-
tion of trade barriers." Globalization is also characterized by a social change
that alters the space where social relations are conducted.'6 Geographic limits
and social relations shift as telecommunication technology deconstructs the
barriers posed by distance and time.' To account for these geographical and
social shifts, governments have responded with policies that reduce trade
barriers and steer their domestic markets into a global arena. 8
The primary cause of globalization is technology. 9 Laws and regula-
tions have facilitated technology's role in the global market, and have em-
powered non-state actors to have an impact on the process.0 Though tech-
nology facilitates the performance of international business and trade, it also
opens MNCs to greater risks that require insurance." For example, commu-
nication networks, financial markets and transportation systems all depend
on information systems and networks." New issues arise for protecting these
14. World Bank, Poverty in an Age of Globalization, at 1, available at http://www.
worldbank.org/econonomicpolicy/globalization/documents/povertyglobalization.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2003).
15. Id. at 2.
16. Heba Shams, Law in the Context of "Globalisation": A Framework of Analysis, 35
INT'L LAW. 1589, 1599 (2001).
17. Id. at 1600.
18. Joe Kendall et al., Terrorism's Burdens on Globalization, 36 INT'L LAW. 49, 50
(2002) (arguing that because the private sector is at the forefront of the war on terrorism, it
must exercise due diligence to help prevent future terrorist attacks so that it will not be left in
the position of having to react to them).
19. See id; Shams, supra note 16, at 1599.
20. Shams, supra note 16, at 1602.
21. See generally lain Gillespie & Taizo Nakatomi, Security in the New Economy,
231/232 Sci. & TECH. 47,48 (2002).
22. Id.
2003]
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systems against malfunction, hacking or cyber-terrorism.23 Though techno-
logical innovations have significantly improved information security, they
also exposes these networks and infrastructures to potentially greater at-
tacks." With an estimated 70% of a company's value embedded in its infor-
mation assets, a cyber attack can have devastating results on a company's
financial strength."
In response, at least one insurer, American International Group ("AIG"),
now offers cyber-terrorism insurance.26 The policy, endorsed by President
Bush, covers computer attacks launched by terrorists from groups such as
AI-Qaeda or Hamas. 7 The White House issued a "National Strategy to Se-
cure Cyberspace Report" that "recommends cyber-insurance 'as a means of
transferring risk and providing for business continuity."'2 8
Another feature of globalization is the transfer of power from state to in-
ternational and domestic non-state actors.29 Insurers are non-state actors who
protect against the risks associated with the vehicles of globalization,
namely, telecommunication, transportation and technology. Without this
protection MNCs may stall their international expansion, thus frustrating
globalization, or assume enormous risk with potentially devastating results.
Terrorism threatens the infrastructures that support telecommunication,
transportation and technology.' In light of terrorism, insurers must be able to
respond to the needs posed by globalization in order to protect MNCs that
pursue international business.
23. Id.
24. Id; see Seita, supra note 9, at 431 (illustrating the advancement of criminal and ter-
rorist activities as a negative effect of globalization because globally available technology fa-
cilitates terrorist organizations to "operate like efficient international businesses").
25. Russ Banham, Preventing the Chain Reaction, REACTIONS, Apr. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.reactionsnet.com/story.asp?id=27902 (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Shams, supra note 16, at 1626. Some state actors have also contributed, such as
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), a U.S. Government agency that pro-
vides political risk insurance for U.S. companies investing in developing countries. See Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation, OPIC at a Glance, at www.opic.gov (last visited Nov.
12, 2003). In an effort to support continued foreign direct investment, OPIC now offers stand-
alone terrorism insurance to "companies whose main insurance concerns are terrorist related."
Meg Green, U.S. Agency to Offer Stand-Alone Terrorism Insurance, BESTWiRE (Aug. 7,
2003).
30. See Lim, supra note 1, at 707.
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B. The Impact of Terrorism on Globalization Within the Insurance Industry
1. Terrorism Defined
While there are numerous proposed definitions of terrorism, there is not
one universally accepted definition.3' A single definition is not possible be-
cause terrorism must be understood in the context of violent activity. 2 Vio-
lent activity is in constant flux because it is influenced and controlled by
technology, international support, media and religion.3 In addition, interpre-
tations of the word "terrorism" change over time, in part according to vari-
ous uses by nations and the media. For example, different nations are not
always willing to classify certain acts as "terrorist."33
The United Nations ("UN") defines terrorism as "the act of destroying
or injuring civilian lives.., or civilian or government property... by indi-
viduals or groups acting independently of governments on their own accord
and belief, in the attempt to effect some political goal."36 U.S. government
agencies employ various broad and narrow definitions for terrorism to allow
flexibility in foreign policy and intelligence investigations. 7 The State De-
partment defines it as "premeditated, politically motivated violence...
against noncombatants.., intended to influence an audience."38 The FBI
criminalizes terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence.., to in-
timidate or coerce a Government, [or] the civilian population... in further-
ance of political or social objectives."39 The U.S. also distinguishes domestic
terrorism from international terrorism.'
For purposes of this Comment, a broad definition of terrorism that in-
cludes the common terms of several states will be used. Terrorism is the use
of acts that are intended to kill or injure civilians with the purpose of intimi-
dating or coercing civilians, a government or an international organization."
31. See JOHN M. MARTIN & ANNE T. ROMANO, Multinational Crime: Terrorism, Espio-
nage, Drug & Arms Trafficking, in STUDIES IN CRIME, LAW, AND JUSTICE 1992, at 34 (James
A. Inciardi ed., 1992) (studying the criminology of terrorism and other multinational crimes
and the international settings in which they operate).
32. See JONATHON R. WHITE, TERRORISM: AN INTRODUCTION 7 (3d ed. 2002) (recogniz-
ing that definitions for terrorism change in light of political, religious and social factors).
33. See id. at 17.
34. MARC MILLER & JASON FILE, TERRORISM FACTBOOK: OUR NATION AT WAR! 13
(2001) (explaining why terrorism is so challenging to define).
35. MARTIN & ROMANO, supra note 31. Terrorists need to also be distinguished from
other perpetrators of political violence, including, but not limited to guerillas, dissidents, in-
surrectionist rebels and separatists. Id. at 31.
36. WHITE, supra note 32, at 12.
37. MILLER & FILE, supra note 34, at 14.
38. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2003).
39. WHITE, supra note 32, at 12.
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1), (5) (2003).
41. See MILLER & FILE, supra note 34, at 15. Cf. Alison R. Orlans, Notes & Comments,
Anti-Terrorism Banking Issues: Terrorism Insurance and Commercial Real Estate: The New
2003]
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This definition considers political, religious and criminal objectives as well
as the intent to strike at the foundations of a particular society or lifestyle. '2
2. The Impact of Terrorism on Globalization
There are two competing views regarding the impact of terrorism on
globalization. The first asserts that because most goods are sent by sea, and
shipping costs have increased very little since September 1 1"t, terrorism has
had little impact on trade and globalization.'3 The other posits that terrorism
may frustrate globalization because the need for increased security and in-
surance will raise the costs of international trade, travel, transportation and
capital flows." The financial consequences rest on the backs of MNCs, be-
cause their operating costs for security in offices, mailrooms and cyber net-
works, as well as shipping costs and insurance premiums, have all increased
substantially.'
Terrorists struck at the core of U.S. globalization philosophy when they
targeted and destroyed the World Trade Center towers in New York. Such an
event could not escape having an impact on globalization. Of the many bur-
dens terrorism poses on globalization, a principal one is on the insurance in-
dustry." The increased scope of terrorism has re-defined the risks insurance
companies are willing to undertake in insuring against it. Following Septem-
ber 1 l , reinsurers ceased coverage for terrorism.'7 Without reinsurance,
primary insurers could not afford to cover terrorism and thus completely
ceased offering the coverage.'8
Frontier, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 93, 113-15 (2003) (comparing various attempts to arrive at a
global definition of terrorism and advocating that the insurance industry agree upon a single
definition of terrorism).
42. Id.
43. See John F. Murphy, The Impact of Terrorism on Globalization and Vice-Versa, 36
INT'L LAW. 77, 81 (2002) (proposing "a sensible process of globalization" may be an effective
deterrent to terrorism) (citing Is it at Risk-Globalisation-Recent events have rattled the
global economic order, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2002, at 65).
44. Lim, supra note 1, at 707.
45. Stephen Roach, Sand in the Gears of Globalization, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 2002, at 43.
The author is the chief economist for Morgan Stanley. Id.
46. See Attanasio & DeAmicis, supra note 11, at 5. For background information on in-
surance and the terrorism exclusion, see generally Jane Kendall, Comment, The Incalculable
Risk: How the World Trade Center Disaster Accelerated the Evolution of Insurance Terror-
ism Exclusions, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 569 (2002).
47. Jackie Spinner, Terrorism Insurance Bill Passed by Senate, WASH. POST, June 19,
2002, at El.
48. Id. Reinsurers provide coverage to a primary insurer to help it diversify its risk of
loss for catastrophic events and to free up some of the primary insurer's reserve capital to in-
vest in other policies. ERIC MILLS HOLMES, 1 HOLMES'S APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 317-18,
320-21 (2d 1996).
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Estimated insured losses from September 110' range from forty"9 to fifty
billion U.S. dollars.' The foreign reinsurer Swiss Re estimated the insurance
industry lost 200 billion dollars in capital since September 1 1', and has only
recovered twenty-six billion dollars in 2001 and nineteen billion dollars in
2002 to compensate the losses." Several individual international insurance
companies endured significant financial losses due to the World Trade Cen-
ter attacks. Lloyd's of London lost 2.8 billion dollars, Munich Re lost 2.6
billion, Swiss Re lost two billion, Germany's Allianz AG lost 1.3 billion and
Zurich Financial Services lost 900 million dollars. 2 Financial analyst firm
Morgan Stanley estimated the premium rates for commercial insurance
would rise from 148 billion dollars in 2000 to between 210 to 240 billion
dollars in 2002.? MNCs fear the rise in maintenance and expansion costs of
their international operations due to terrorism?' Whereas globalization for-
merly facilitated the outsourcing of production, foreign investments and
trade flow, September 11 disrupted the status quo by upsetting the major
world economies simultaneously.
3. Terrorism Insurance Coverage Prior to September 1 'h
Prior to September 11 , terrorism insurance was usually included gratui-
tously on policies because the risk of such a catastrophic event was consid-
ered very low. 6 Terrorism risks were primarily covered by reinsurers, who
49. Joseph B. Treaster, Senate Passes Bill Limiting Insurers' Liability After an Attack,
N.Y. TIES, Nov. 20, 2002, at A15.
50. Christopher Oster, Terrorism Bill Boosts Insurers' Risk, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2002,
at C9.
51. Andrew Bolger, Companies and Finance International-Reinsurance Rates Weaken,
FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 2003, at 26.
52. Lucien J. Dhooge, The Terrorism Insurance Market After September 11: The Case
for Limited Federal Intervention, 34 McGEORGE L. REv. 27, 33 (2002) (citations omitted).
53. Roach, supra note 45.
54. See generally id.
55. Id.
56. Patrick Lenain et al., The Fallout from Terrorism: Security and the Economy,
231/232 OBSERVER 9, 11 (2002). See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding acts of terrorism are not exempt from policy coverage
under the war risk exclusion). See also Annemarie Sedore, Note, War Risk Exclusions in the
21" Century: Applying War Risk Exclusions to the Attacks of September I 1"', 82 B.U. L. REV.
1041, 1061 (2002) (arguing insurers could have legally invoked war risk exclusions because
the U.S.' response to the terrorist attacks, but that it was proper for them not to given the po-
tential negative consequences to the insurance industry); Steven Plitt, The Changing Face of
Global Terrorism and a New Look of War: An Analysis of the War-Risk Exclusion in the
Wake of the Anniversary of September 11, and Beyond, 39 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 31, 91-92
(2003) (asserting war-risk exclusions should not apply to acts of global terrorism and the fed-
eral terrorism insurance should be provided to promote U.S. exports and trade in a globalized
world).
2003]
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typically underwrite catastrophic coverage. ' In the past, the insurance indus-
try has recovered from catastrophic events independently. 8 What is it that
makes terrorism insurance different than other types of catastrophic cover-
age, from which the insurance industry has been able to recover and continue
coverage free of help from the federal government? 9
4. Insurance Coverage Subsequent to September 11 h
Numerous types of insurance policies realized claims due to the Sep-
tember 118 attacks.' Though several types of insurance policies are needed
in order to conduct international business, this comment will focus on two
types of coverage: commercial property and business interruption insur-
ance."1 Commercial property insurance covers the value of the physical prop-
erty that has been destroyed. 2 Business interruption coverage compensates
the insured for lost income resulting from destroyed property or any disrup-
tion to the insured's business.63 The purpose of business interruption insur-
ance is to restore the insured to the same position they would have been in
had there been no interruption to the business.' Since September 11 , busi-
nesses have been greatly concerned with the availability and coverage for
business interruption insurance.'
57. Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 647,
648-49, Sep. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 22917511 (rationalizing a temporary role for the
U.S. government to provide a backstop for terrorism insurance).
58. Id. at 648 (explaining the insurance industry's recovery process, without outside as-
sistance, after Hurricane Andrew in 1992).
59. Id.
60. See NAIC Statement Regarding Impact of Tragedy on the Insurance Industry (News
Release, Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.naic.org/pressroom/releases/ EmergencyRe-
sponse.htm. The various types of claims expected to be submitted were for 1) property losses
for the buildings and their contents; 2) business interruption claims due to damaged property
and prohibited continuance of business; 3) workers' compensation; 4) health insurance claims
for injuries not covered by workers' compensation; 5) life insurance; and 6) auto insurance for
vehicles damaged or destroyed near the World Trade Center site. Id.
61. See Robert L. Carter et al., Business Interruption Coverage: The Basics, in
MAXIMIZING INSURANCE RECOVERY FOR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION CLAMS 33, 35 (2002). "Af-
ter the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in Washington D.C., New York, and Pennsyl-
vania, the insurance world's attention has turned to property insurance and business interrup-
tion insurance." Id.
62. Randy Paar, The Elements of a Business Interruption Claim, in MAXIMIZING
INSURANCE RECOVERY FOR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION CLAIMS 7, 10 (2002).
63. Id.
64. Carter et al., supra note 61, at 35.
65. Paar, supra note 62, at 9. "Five elements (that) typically contribute to a business in-
terruption claim: 1) a covered peril; 2) the covered peril must result in a loss of covered prop-
erty; 3) the loss of covered property must result in an interruption of the policyholder's busi-
ness operations; 4) the business interruption must result in a covered loss; and 5) the covered
loss must occur during the 'period of restoration,' while the lost or damaged property is re-
stored or replaced." Id. at 12-13.
8
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September 1 1' radically altered the way the insurance industry conducts
its business.' Even if the actual risk remains low,67 insurers no longer pro-
vide coverage free of charge. They must integrate terrorism risks within their
risk-management models and strive to predict the possibilities of future at-
tacks." The uncertainty of calculating risks, targets and scope of damage is
what differentiates terrorism from other catastrophic events.' Though it will
require an arduous effort to develop an accurate system for such statistics, it
is not impossible."0 In addition, because terrorist acts are not entirely arbi-
trary, intelligence information may be a source to help determine premium
rates.7' The insurance industry, employing its experts in risk control man-
agement, may be best qualified to compose contingency plans and aid a cor-
poration in increasing its protection against terrorist attacks.72 Risk control
experts can use their expertise in the control of loss to create plans to control
the spread of a fire or recovery from an explosion. 3
Insurance policies had to pay for workers' compensation, life, property
and business coverage resulting from the events of September 1 1h'. Encom-
passed within the policies were the losses pertaining to telecommunication,
transportation and technology, the primary vehicles of globalization. When
the Department of Homeland Security raises its terror alert level, business
owners grow more concerned about potential threats to their businesses.7 '
Considering the potential damage to a company's infrastructure in the event
of another devastating terrorist attack, the need for effective insurance cov-
erage against these risks becomes increasingly apparent. In response, the
U.S. followed the lead of other countries and created a national terrorism in-
surance program where the federal government serves as a reinsurer to pri-
mary. insurance companies.
66. Kevin T. Kenny & Judith L. Robinson, The Insurance Market Today, in INSURANCE
LAW: UNDERSTANDING THE ABCs 41, 50 (2d ed. 1996).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Brown et al., supra note 57, at 648.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 652. Risk managers could take into account warnings from the Departments
of State and Homeland Security to help calculate risks.
72. See Gene Rappe, The Role of Insurance in the Battle Against Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL
Bus. L.J. 351, 355 (1999).
73. Id. at 356.
74. Heightened U.S. Terror Alert Prompts Public Service Release of Risk and Insurance
Information to Businesses, PR NEWSWIRE, May 23, 2003, at Financial News.
20031
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II. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM'S IMPACT
ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
A. U.S. Response to the Insurance Crisis Posed by the September 11"'
Terrorist Attacks
1. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
In responding to claims from September 1 1b, insurance companies did
not try to claim a "war-time" exclusion" but rather agreed to pay according
to the policies.76 However, they were reluctant to insure against future terror-
ist attacks." In response to this reluctance, the U.S. government proposed the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ("TRIA"),8 under which the govern-
ment compels insurance companies to insure for terrorism.79 In its statement
of purpose, Congress recognized that "the ability of businesses and individu-
als to obtain property and casualty insurance at reasonable and predictable
prices... is critical to economic growth... as well as to the promotion of
United States exports and foreign trade in an increasingly interconnected
world."8 Congress enacted TRIA to provide continued coverage and afford-
able and predictable premiums for terrorism insurance while the insurance
sector stabilizes from its September 1 1b losses."
a. TRIA Definition for Act of Terrorism
TRIA defines an act of terrorism as:
a violent act or act that is dangerous to human life; property; or infrastruc-
ture... committed by an individual or individuals acting on behalf of any
foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an effort to coerce the civilian
75. A war-time exclusion normally provides that the insurer is not liable for any event
occurring during a declared, undeclared or civil war; any typical war action by a military; or
any acts in pursuit or defense of an insurrection, revolution or rebellion. Sedore, supra note
56, at 1061 n.10 (citing Andrew J. Nocas, Are You Covered When We're at War? Are You
Sure?, 1991 A.B.A. 20 SUM BRIEF 10, 13 (1991)).
76. Sedore, supra note 56, at 1057.
77. Brown et al., supra note 57, at 655.
78. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002)
[hereinafter TRIA] (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 50).
79. See generally Dhooge, supra note 52 (comparing the three primary proposals for fed-
eral terrorism insurance and evaluating the primary provisions of TRIA).
80. TRIA § 101(a)(1) (emphasis added).
81. Id. § 101(b)(l)-(2); see NAIC, The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002: Summary
Based on November 11, 2002 Draft, Section 101, at http://www.naic.org/pressroom/ re-
leases/terrorismrisk_ins-act.2002.pdf (Nov. 15, 2002).
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population of the United States or to influence the pjolicy or affect the
conduct of the United States Government by coercion."
It only covers acts of terrorism where the ensuing damage occurs in the
U.S., 3 or outside the U.S. if aboard an air carrier, vessel or on the premises
of a U.S. mission.' Congress asserts that this is the sole definition to be used
in determining an act of terrorism. Any conflicting state law or federal
agency definitions for terrorism are preempted when applying TRIA." The
Secretary of Treasury, in agreement with the Secretary of State and the U.S.
Attorney General, determines whether or not a certain act will be considered
an act of terrorism." The final determination of what is a terrorist act is not
subject to judicial review.87
b. Insurers' Participation and Responsibilities
The Department of Treasury administers TRIA.88 The Act requires all
primary insurers to participate and offer terrorism insurance to their policy-
holders.89 Reinsurance coverage under TRIA is only available to primary in-
surers, which are defined as "any entity ... [or] affiliate ... that is licensed
or admitted to engage in the business of providing primary or excess insur-
ance in any State." TRIA annuls any provisions in insurance policies that
exclude a primary insurer from providing terrorism insurance.9 It also in-
validates any state's approval to exclude terrorism coverage in an insurance
contract.' A preexisting terrorism exclusion provision can only be reinstated
if: 1) the policyholder expressly authorizes its reinstatement;93 or 2) the poli-
cyholder does not pay the increased premium that provides for the terrorism
coverage and is given notice of the reinstatement of the exclusion provi-
sion.94
82. TRIA § 102(1) (emphasis added). Thus, acts executed by domestic terrorists or occur
as a part of a war declared by the U.S. Congress are excluded from coverage. Id. §
102(1)(B)(i). See Orlans, supra note 41, at 118 (critiquing TRIA's definition of terrorism).
83. United States is defined to include the fifty states, the Commonwealths of Puerto
Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, all U.S. territories and possessions, the U.S. continen-
tal shelf and the U.S. territorial sea (twelve miles from the U.S. baseline, as determined ac-
cording to international law). TRIA § 102(l)(15); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2280, 2281.
84. TRIA § 102(1)(A)(iii)(I), (II).
85. Id. § 106(a)(2)(A).
86. Id. § 102(l)(A).
87. Id. § 102(l)(C). See also Dhooge, supra note 52, at 56 (comparing TRIA's definition
of terrorism to definitions of terrorism found in other federal statutes).
88. TRIA § 103(a)(1).
89. Id. §§ 103(a)(3), 103(c).
90. Id. § 102(6)(A)(i). Non-licensed insurers also qualify if they are eligible as surplus
line carriers on the NAIC's Quarterly Listing of Alien Insurers. Id. § 102(6)(A)(ii).
91. ld. § 105(a).
92. Id. § 105(b).
93. Id. § 105(c)(1).
94. Id. § 105(c)(2)(A)-(B).
20031
11
Pietanza: Winning the Risky Global Business Game: Parrying the Thrusts of T
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2003
96 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
If a qualifying terrorist act occurs, government coverage will take effect
only if the terrorist act causes over five million dollars in damage to losses
covered by property and casualty insurance." TRIA requires primary insur-
ers to pay a fixed percentage of their annual premiums to compensate poli-
cyholders, while the U.S. Government remunerates ninety percent of the re-
mainder of the claim.' The percentages to be paid are set forth in the
following schedule: 1) In 2002, the insurer pays one percent of its 2002 pre-
miums it has received until the time of the attack; 2) In 2003, the insurer
pays seven percent of its 2002 premiums; 3) During 2004, the insurer must
pay up to ten percent of its 2003 premiums; 4) For acts occurring during
2005, the insurer must pay fifteen percent of its premiums earned during
2004.' 7 The government will not pay for any terrorism-insured losses that
exceed $100 billion in a given year.98 There is also a partial repayment provi-
sion where the government will place a surcharge on property and casualty
insurance policyholders.99
c. Litigation Under TRIA
For any disputes resulting from property damage, personal injury or
death due to the terrorist act, TRIA creates an exclusive federal cause of ac-
tion." The federal action precludes litigation in state courts.' The court
must apply the state law where the terrorist attack occurred, unless the state
law is preempted by federal law.'" Related cases may be consolidated in one
district court.0 3
Corporations enjoy no immunity from being sued for damages resulting
from a terrorist attack."4 Any punitive damages awarded will not be consid-
ered insured losses for the corporate defendant." As for the perpetrators of
the devastating act, TRIA does not limit the liability of any government or
organization that in any way knowingly contributes to the terrorist act." If
95. Id. § 102(1)(B)(ii). Property and casualty insurance include excess insurance, work-
ers' compensation and surety insurance. It does not include insurance for private mortgages,
financial guarantees, medical malpractice, Federal crop insurance and reinsurance. Id. §
102(12)(A)-(B)(vii).
96. Id. § 103(e)(1)(A).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 103(e)(2)(A). To receive compensation, the policyholder must file a claim with
the insurer, who processes the claim and submits it to the Secretary of Treasury. Id. §
103(b)(1), (3), (4).
99. Id. § 103(e)(8)(A)(i).
100. Id. § 107(a)(1).
101. Id. § 107(a)(2).
102. Id. § 107(a)(3).
103. Id. § 107(a)(4).
104. Id. § 107(a)(5)
105. Id.
106. Id. § 107(b).
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there is a judgment against a terrorist, TRIA allows for its enforcement by
permitting the blocking of terrorist assets. 7
d. The Future of TRIA
TRIA is scheduled to terminate on December 31, 2005.'08 Prior to termi-
nation, the Secretary of Treasury, the NAIC, insurance industry representa-
tives, policyholder representatives and insurance experts will convene to as-
sess TRIA's utility."° The working group will discuss whether the insurance
industry will be able to offer terrorism insurance at a reasonable expense af-
ter TRIA expires."' Representatives for insurers will consider insurers' ca-
pacity for all types of policyholders, but will focus on the insurers for trans-
portation and shipping systems."' The working group shall present a report
of its assessment to Congress no later than June 25, 2005. The expected
long-term result of TRIA is that insurers will be able to once again provide
terrorism insurance for affordable premiums. " '
The Department of Treasury is currently seeking comments from corpo-
rations and insurance providers before it finally implements TRIA."4 It is-
sued interim guidance for specific TRIA provisions on December 11,
2002, " ' December 26, 2002, "6 January 29, 2003"' and March 27, 2003.18
Along with each notice, the Department of Treasury explained that the in-
terim guidance may be relied upon unless the actual regulations of subse-
quent instructions supplant them. "9 It is still accepting comments on the in-
107. Id. § 201(b)(1).
108. Id. § 108(a). See also U.S. Dep't of the Treas., Interim Final Rule, at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-institution/terrforism-insurance/
(Apr. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Interim Final Rule].
109. TRIA § 108(d)(1).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. ld. § 108(d)(2).
113. Christian Murray, Business, Lauds Insurance Bill/Terror Aid Seen as Economic
Boost, NEWSDAY, Nov. 27, 2002, at A27.
114. For explanatory and contact information, see Interim Final Rule, supra note 108.
115. See Interim Guidance I, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,206 (Dec. 11, 2002) (to be codified at 31
U.S.C. § 50) (addressing statutory disclosure obligations and the requirement that insurers
must provide terrorism insurance).
116. See Interim Guidance II, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,864 (Dec. 26, 2003) (to be codified at 31
U.S.C. § 50) (clarifying categories of insurers required to participate and what losses are to be
covered under the program).
117. See Interim Guidance III, 68 Fed. Reg. 4544 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 31
U.S.C. § 50) (focusing on issues for foreign insurers and further addressing disclosure and
certification inquiries).
118. See Interim Guidance IV, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,039 (Mar. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 31
U.S.C. § 50) (instructing insurers how rebut the presumption of control explained in the first
set of interim instructions).
119. Interim Final Rule, supra note 108.
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terim final rules it published on February 25, 2003 and April 15, 2003 that
will be codified in the Code of Federal Regulations."'
2. Critiques of TRIA
a. Insurers' Perspectives
Initially, there was dissent among insurers concerning whether or not
September 11Ih actually launched an insurance crisis. Some experts said the
insurance industry, with over three trillion dollars in assets, had more than
enough capital on hand to manage the payouts and still remain financially
solvent.' Others asserted September 1 1" was the greatest insured loss in his-
tory and the effects devastated the industry.' Even though the industry sur-
vived the September 11"' payouts, the subsequent withdrawal of reinsurers
coupled with the difficulty of pricing terrorism coverage created a disruption
in the terrorism insurance market.' Not surprisingly, many insurers wel-
comed TRIA as a positive method to allow the insurance industry to recover
from all the losses it suffered. 2 ' Insurers also applaud TRIA because it pro-
tects consumers by keeping insurance rates affordable.'25
Despite its enthusiasm, the insurance industry has voiced a few concerns
over TRIA. First, because terrorism coverage is mandatory, insurers may be
liable for amounts that are very high in comparison to their capital. 26 Sec-
ond, because it is difficult to price terrorism, insurers may create policies ex-
ceeding risk levels they normally would undertake.'27 Third, liquidity is a
worry because it is unknown how quickly the government will reimburse in-
surers.'28 Fourth, TRIA does not apply if terrorist acts occur during a U.S.
Congress-declared war, which has potential for many ambiguities."9 Finally,
legal proceedings may be involved in the settlement disputes, which may
prove costly and lengthy.'
120. Id.
121. See NAIC Statement Regarding Impact of Tragedy on the Insurance Industry, supra
note 60. "Due to the tragic events that occurred in the United States yesterday...
[p]olicyholders can rest assured knowing that the insurance industry in the United States is an
$850 billion industry with assets of over $3 trillion." id.
122. Id. (asserting the President of the American Insurance Association stated the insured
losses from September 11 would surpass the industry's profits for the previous three years).
123. Brown et al., supra note 57, at 655-56.
124. See Terror Act Requires Notification, INs. & TECH. 10, Feb. 1, 2003.
125. Editorial, Terrorism Insurance; Needed Government Backup Comes with a Man-
date for Insurers, BuFF. NEWS, Dec. 5, 2002, at B8.
126. Dean Patterson, Insurers Ratings Likely Hurt by New U.S. Terrorism Insurance
Law-S&P Update, AFX NEws LTD., Nov. 26, 2002, at Company News.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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The industry's concerns can be summarized as fear of being "on the
hook for greater risk but [with] limited savvy or experience in managing
it."'3 Consequently, insurance industry financial ratings are in jeopardy.'
The government has only tried to allay one of its concerns. The President, in
a statement to the Secretary of Treasury, urged proposing a rule where the
Treasury Department would provide advanced approval for any insurer's
proposed settlement arising from an act of terrorism.'33
b. Corporations' Perspective
Corporations have voiced a few objections to TRIA. First, there is a re-
payment provision where a policy surcharge will be applied to recover any
federal payments that surpass the statutory "mandatory recoupment amount"
during any of the program's functioning years.' " Second, businesses are
concerned that the definition of a terrorist act is to be determined by the Sec-
retary of Treasury and is not subject to judicial review.'35 Third, some claim
TRIA does not go far enough because it does not cover acts of domestic ter-
rorism, making it difficult to find an insurer who will include such coverage
in a policy.'36 Fourth, if Congress declares war prior to a terrorist attack on
U.S. soil, there is worry the coverage will not take effect.'37 Fifth, given the
anthrax threat and possibility of a dirty bomb, businesses would also prefer
coverage for acts arising from nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.138
Sixth, some corporations secured terrorism insurance prior to passage of
TRIA. For these "double coverage situations," it is unclear what is to come
of the premiums they have already paid. 39 Seventh, because TRIA is in ef-
fect for only three years, companies are concerned about what will replace
i.140it.'
Finally, the most voiced concern of corporations is that any punitive
damages awarded in a civil lawsuit will not qualify as insured losses under
TRIA.14 ' Members of Congress argue that if such protection was afforded, it
could prevent businesses from taking precautionary steps against a future
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021126-13.html (Nov. 26, 2002).
134. Diana Morrissey & Andrea Carruthers, What the Terrorism Insurance Law Means
for Business, Faegre & Benson Legal Updates, at www.faegre.com/articles/article_776.asp
(last visited Nov. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Faegre Report].
135. Id.
136. Christine Dugas, Many Firms Shun Federal Terrorism Insurance, USA TODAY,
Apr. 3, 2003, at 6B.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Faegre Report, supra note 134.
140. Dugas, supra note 136.
141. TRIA § 107(a)(5). The bill in the House of Representatives allowed punitive dam-
ages to be considered as insured losses. See Orlans, supra note 41, at 108.
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terrorist attack." Corporations fear the potentially devastating amounts of
damages awarded to victims in civil lawsuits.' 3 However, because TRIA al-
lows for consolidation of suits, uncertainty is reduced because of the single
forum and legal standard to be employed."
c. Taxpayers' Perspective
Taxpayers' central concern with TRIA is that their money is being used
to fund a potentially enormous federal liability that serves as nothing but a
bailout for the insurance industry.'" If the insurance industry remains finan-
cially solvent following its payouts for the September 1 1h attacks, taxpayer
money should not be used to compensate the industry. The National Taxpay-
ers' Union ("NTU") is concerned that the government-backed program will
allow insurers to subscribe high-risk policyholders they would not normally
subscribe." TRIA would thus effectively eliminate an insurer's motivation
to be cautious in underwriting certain risks.47 The lack of caution in under-
writing could create a terrorism insurance industry that would not be sus-
tainable without federal backing. The insurance industry's response to using
taxpayer money is that terrorism insurance raises national security concerns,
and taxpayers are sharing the burden with insurers.'48
d. Consumers' Perspective
Although the Consumer Federation of America ("CFA") recognizes the
need for some aid to the insurance industry, it has been a strong opponent of
TRIA. The chief consumer concern is that a federal backstop will prevent
insurance agencies from being able to independently offer affordable cover-
age for terrorism risks."9 CFA alleges TRIA's expansive coverage prevents
holding the private industry responsible for responding to the problem of ter-
142. U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, President Signs Terrorism Insurance Bill (Nov. 26,
2002) (reaction of Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-leahy/press/2002 11/112602a.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2003). But see
Orlans, supra note 41, at 121-22 (arguing building owners should not be liable for punitive
damages because no amount of prevention and responsiveness can alleviate the risk of terror-
ism due to its arbitrary character).
143. See Orlans, supra note 41, at 121-22.
144. Brown et al., supra note 57, at 655.
145. Gregg J. Loubier & Jason B. Aro, Practice Tips: Insuring the Risks of Terror, 25
L.A. LAW. 18, 20 (2002). See also Dan Levy, Bush Signs Law to Shield Insurers, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 27, 2002, at B 1, available at 2002 WL 4036722.
146. Richard Allyn & Heather McNeff, Justice in a Changed World: The Fall and Rise
of Terrorism Insurance Coverage Since September 11, 2001, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 821,
833 (2003) (statement of David A. Moss, Associate Professor, Harvard Business School).
147. Id.
148. Symposium, A Risky Business? What Happens to Terrorism Coverage If Insurers
Can't Afford To Offer It?, 9 CoRP. CouNs. 64 (2002).
149. But see Loubier & Aro, supra note 145, at 18.
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rorism insurance."5 In addition, the government's role could inhibit the nec-
essary private development of the insurance industry and could upset the pri-
vate markets.1
51
In January 2002, CFA published a report contending: 1) there is too
much capital in the insurance industry; 2) medium and larger size companies
bore most of the problems resulting from September 11"' because of high in-
surance rates; 3) the economic cycle, and not just the terrorist attacks, were
also responsible for the insurance problem; 4) banks continued to loan
money to companies despite the lack of terrorism insurance; and 5) there es-
sentially was no major economic problem caused by the lack of availability
of terrorism insurance.5 5 For these reasons, CFA argued that Congress
should not have felt compelled to pass the legislation.5 5 Because CFA be-
lieves there was no potential economic crisis due to the lack of terrorism in-
surance, it contends TRIA is an unnecessary and ineffective response.
B. Foreign Responses to the Insurance Crisis Resulting from the Terrorist
Attacks of September 1 1h
The U.S. is not the first country to implement legislation for terrorism
insurance. Nor was it the first country to pass insurance legislation as a di-
rect response to the September 11 h attacks. For other countries that have al-
ready addressed the problem, coverage generally falls under one of two
categories: the foreign government acts either as a reinsurer or as a direct in-
surer.'"' For those countries that passed insurance legislation as a direct result
150. Levy, supra note 145.
151. Brown et al., supra note 57, at 651.
152. Allyn & McNeff, supra note 146, at 834 (citing J. Robert Hunter, How the Lack of
Federal Backup for Terrorism Insurance has Affected Insurers and Consumers: An Analysis
of Market Conditions and Policy Implications (2002)).
153. Id; but see Testimony of Mark J. Warshawsky Before U.S. House of Reps. (Feb. 27,
2002) (explaining the negative economic impact resulting from the non-availability of terror-
ism insurance), available at www.ustreas.gov/offices/economicpolicy/press/testimony
_terrorism risk insurance.pdf.
154. Israel serves as direct insurer for terrorism claims. See Dwight Jaffee & Thomas
Russell, Extreme Events and the Market for Terrorist Insurance (for presentation to Nat'l Bu-
reau of Economic Research Insurance Conference, Feb. 2002), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jaffee/Papers/JRInsFeb02.pdf (revised draft Jan. 11, 2001). It
created two mandatory terrorism insurance programs funded by taxes; private policies provide
additional coverage for business interruption insurance. Thomas J. McCool, Terrorism Insur-
ance: Alternative Programs for Protecting Insurance Consumers, Rep. GAO-02-199T, avail-
able at http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/gao02l99t-terrorO2O2.pdf (Oct. 21,
2001). It also pays medical bills and lost wages for victims to personal injury victims and
their families for citizens, visitors and tourists. Id. Northern Ireland enacted the Criminal
Damage (Compensation Order of 1977) to cover damages incurred by either riotous assembly
or malicious acts committed on behalf of an unlawful association; insurers effectively regard
these as terrorism claims. Terrorism Coverage Elsewhere, RISK MGMT. MAG., available at
http://www.drj.comspecial/wtc/w3_066.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2003). Spain's Consorcio
de Compensaci6n de Seguros ("Consorcio") is a mandatory government-financed insurance
pool to cover terrorism claims as well as natural catastrophes; private insurers may provide
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of September 11 or are in the process of doing so, the countries primarily
followed the model established by Britain's Pool Re insurance scheme.'55
1. Insurance Coverage for Terrorist Attacks: Britain's Pool Re
Following a sequence of terrorism attacks in Great Britain, global rein-
surers ceased covering primary insurers who insured commercial property in
Great Britain.'56 In 1993, in order to prevent terrorist acts from disturbing
commercial transactions and the economy, the British government set up
what is commonly known as Pool Re, a mutual insurance company that in-
sures commercial properties against terrorism.'57 Pool Re insures for dam-
ages to physical property and for losses resulting from the loss of use of
property.58 Pool Re defines a terrorist act as "an act of any person acting on
behalf of or in connection with any organisation with activities directed to-
wards the overthrowing or influencing of any government de jure or de facto
by force or violence."' 59 In its capacity as a reinsurer to Pool Re, the U.K.
government is an insurer of last resort." ° Participation in Pool Re is not
mandatory.' 6' However, the government's reinsurance payments are only
available through Pool Re. 2
additional coverage, such as for business interruption. Id. France requires insurers to provide
terrorism insurance for property damage; the primary insurer can either retain the risk or rein-
sure it with a private reinsurer or a French government-controlled reinsurer. Id. In addition,
French insurers are required to contribute to a national pool to compensate victims harmed in
a terrorist attack. Id. The South African government teamed up with the fifteen largest direct
insurers to create the South African Strikes and Riots Insurance Association ("SASRIA"). Id.
The government acts as an insurer of last resort and has been able to meet most of the coun-
try's business needs. Id. To learn more about Israel's insurance programs, Spain's Consorcio,
South Africa's SASRIA and the U.K.'s Pool Re, see Mark Boran, Note, To Insure or Not to
Insure, That is the Question: Congress' Attempt to Bolster the Insurance Industry After the
Attacks on September 11, 2001, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL. COMMENT. 523, 548-60 (2003).
155. Andrew Bolger, Terrorism: Outside the U.S.: Organisations Dealing with 'Ex-
traordinary Risk' Have Seen Their Profiles Soar Since September 11, FIN. TIMES (London),
May 24, 2002, at 2.
156. Pool Re and Terrorism Insurance in Great Britain, TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN
NEWSL, at http://www.tillinghast.comtillinghast/publications/publications/tillupdateuk/Uk
PoolReand_Terrorism/20020521 1 l.pdf (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter Tillinghast Report]. Till-
inghast-Towers Penin is a leading global consultant in the insurance industry. Id. For a de-
tailed comparison of Pool Re to the antecedents of TRIA, see Andrew S. Neuwalt, The Impact
of September 11 on Terrorism Insurance: Comparing Senate Bill 2600, House of Representa-
tives Bill 3210, and the United Kingdom's Pool Re, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 473 (2003).
157. Tillinghast Report, supra note 156.
158. Id.
159. Provisions of Terrorism and Riot Coverage in Different Countries, at
http://astre.scor.com/astrehelp/en/assur/inc/extensionuk/terrorism.htm (emphasis added) (last
visited Mar. 22, 2003). Scor is a French-based global reinsurance company. Id.
160. See Jaffee & Russell, supra note 154.
161. See Tillinghast Report, supra note 156.
162. Id.
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The majority of businesses in London were not persuaded to purchase
terrorism insurance through Pool Re until about ten years after its incep-
tion.'63 In response to September 1 ph, insurers and companies urged the Brit-
ish government to extend Pool Re's coverage to include employee liabilities
and personal injury."' The system was evaluated in light of September 11"'
and several changes to the Pool Re system became effective January 1,
2003." One change expands coverage from damages caused by fire and ex-
plosion to all types of risks." An exclusion was created for cyber attacks,
due to the difficulty in proving such an attack is perpetrated by terrorists. 67
There is no longer an exclusion for terrorist attacks caused by nuclear weap-
ons.'68 Finally, there are no changes to Pool Re's war risk exclusion or prop-
erty coverage; only commercial properties remain eligible for coverage."
2. Foreign Legislative and Corporate Responses to the Insurance Crisis
Posed by the Terrorist Attacks of September 1 1'
Many countries, several of which already had some form of terrorism
insurance in place, quickly responded to the September 1 1h attacks by enact-
ing legislation for terrorism insurance.
a. France
Prior to September 1 1"', the French-government based reinsurer Caisse
Centrale de Reassurance ("CCR") reinsured any event classified as a "natu-
ral catastrophe" according to French law.' French law considers terrorist
acts to be "natural catastrophes."'' In response to September 110', France
was the first country to enact new terrorist insurance legislation. It created
the Gestion de l'Assurance et de la Reassurance des Risques Attentats et
Actes de Terrorisme, or GAREAT, in January 2002."' GAREAT is a state-
163. Brendan Noonan, Brokers, Insurers Struggle with Rollout of Terror Coverage, BEST
WIRE, Apr. 8, 2003.
164. Bolger, supra note 155.
165. Julian Coglan, Terrorism: Changes to Pool Re Summary Paper, at
http://astre.scor.comlastrehelp/enlqualif/env/pool%20re%20changes.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2003).
166. Id.
167. Bolger, supra note 155.
168. Id.
169. Id. In addition to Pool Re, small and medium-sized companies are purchasing ter-
rorism insurance through the joint efforts of the British Insurance Brokers' Association and
underwriters from Lloyd's of London, who are providing terrorism coverage to smaller busi-
nesses interested in insuring possible liabilities to the public and employees. Andrew Bolger,
Cover for Terrorism Offered to Smaller Companies, FIN. TIMES, Sept, 2, 2003, at 2.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Ben Dyson, Government Terrorism Schemes: With a Little Help From Their Ene-
mies, REACTIONS, July 1, 2002, available at http://www.reactionsnet.constory.asp?id=21242.
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backed commercial insurance pool for terrorist acts, managed by representa-
tives from insurance and reinsurance companies.'7 3 Direct insurers pay for
the first 250 million euros in annual loss due to terrorism claims.' The next
750 million euros are covered by international insurance and reinsurance
markets.'75 The French government pays the next 500 million euros worth of
claims.76 The final 1.5 billion euros of available coverage is provided by the
CCR. 77
b. Germany
In November 2002, Germany created Extremus AG, a state-backed in-
surance pool to help the private insurance market cope with terrorism
claims.77 Extremus AG is composed of private insurers who provide cover-
age for acts of terrorism that result in claims costing from twenty-five mil-
lion to three billion euros. 19 The German government receives a percentage
of the premiums paid to the private insurers.'80 In exchange, it provides an
additional ten billion euros in coverage.' 8 ' Since its inception, Extremus has
executed 855 insurance contracts with annual premiums reaching 1.4 million
euros'8 Demand has been limited thus far, but it claims "the tensions caused
by terrorism will continue to exist[,] '"' thus requiring Extremus to maintain
its offering of services.
c. Australia
In October 2002 Australia proposed the Terrorism Insurance Bill, which
created the Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation that took effect July 1,
2003. 84 Private insurers will pay the first ten million Australian dollars (6.4
million U.S. dollars) in claims.' The insurance pool will pay for costs sur-
passing the ten million mark up to one billion Australian dollars (640 million
U.S. dollars), and the Australian government will pay for further losses of up
173. See Tillinghast Report, supra note 156.
174. Bolger, supra note 155.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Dyson, supra note 172.
179. Bolger, supra note 155.
180. Id.
181. Id; Dyson, supra note 172.
182. Herbert Fromme, Low Demand for German Terrorism Cover, LLOYD'S LIST (Lon-
don), Apr. 3, 2003, at 2.
183. Id. (quoting Bruno Gas, Chief Executive Officer of Extremus).
184. Parliament of Australia, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Australian Ter-
rorism Insurance Bill 2002, Bill Digest No. 110, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/
pubs/bd/2002-03/03bd I I 0.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
185. Valerie Mason, Insurance Premiums to Increase for Australian Businesses Over
Terrorism Fears, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Aug. 18, 2003.
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to nine billion Australian dollars (5.7 billion U.S. dollars). 6 The scheme
plans to cover damages caused by terrorist activities resulting from fire,
floods, explosions, airplane crashes and biological and chemical weapons,
but not by nuclear weapons. 7 It will cover for loss or damage to physical
property, business interruption and resulting third-party liabilities if they are
related to the insured property.
88
The main difference between Australia's Terrorism Insurance Bill and
TRIA is that, in Australia, subscription to the coverage will be mandated.8 9
Whether a covered property is considered low-risk for a terrorist attack, or it
employs competent risk management that could prevent a terrorist attack, all
organizations will need to subscribe to it.' All policyholders will be re-
quired to pay an additional two percent of their premium payments to the
government as a levy.' Organizations with properties in the capitals of Aus-
tralian states and territories will pay an additional ten percent surcharge
while those in other urban areas will pay an additional two percent sur-
charge." The program is expected to raise approximately 300 million Aus-
tralian dollars from the levies and surcharges.'93 While the Association of
Risk and Insurance Managers of Australasia Ltd. is pleased the Legislature
has addressed the issue of terrorism insurance, it does not believe participa-
tion should be mandatory.'9 4 However, the Australian Bankers' Association
welcomes the compulsory nature of the bill because it ensures their borrow-
ers are sufficiently protected from terrorism risks.'95
d. Corporate and Other Responses
In a private effort, a group of European insurers entered into an agree-
ment to provide terrorism insurance.' 6 Allianz, a German insurance group,
set up the first corporate insurance pool based out of Luxembourg, Bel-
186. Parliament of Australia, supra note 184.
187. Id.
188. Michael Bradford, Aussies May See Terror Cover Mandate, Bus. INs., Apr. 28,
2003, at 17.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Peter Hunt, New Tax for Terrorism, WKLY. TIMES (Australia), May 14, 2003, at 21.
194. Bradford, supra note 188. The Australian insurance industry is concerned that cer-
tain foreign insurers will ignore the Terrorism Insurance Act and not contribute to the pool
fund, leaving their clients without coverage for potential devastating liabilities. Morgan Mel-
lish, Local Business Cover at Risk, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Aug. 18, 2003, at 5.
195. Bradford, supra note 188.
196. See Lenain et al., supra note 56, at 11. "[A] group of European insurance and rein-
surance companies has recently announced their intention to set up a pool to cover against
limited terrorism risk." Id.
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gium.'" The company, called Special Risk Insurance and Reinsurance Lux-
embourg S.A. ("SRIR"), provides limited coverage to property insured
against acts of terrorism.'98 The policies do not provide business interruption
coverage, and focus their coverage in Europe.'" Coverage is limited to 275
million euros and policies are provided to both insurers and reinsurers."° Ac-
cused of undermining requests for state-backed programs for terrorism in-
surance, SRIR did not intend to replace any government-sponsored insur-
ance pools that have been created in response to September I 1h .2o1 It merely
provides a complementary avenue for insurance coverage.'a However, less
than one year after it initially offered its services, SRIR is no longer accept-
ing new business because there is little demand for its product."3 SRIR is not
underwriting new policies because of the presence of several government-
backed insurance programs." In addition, though companies are more aware
of terrorism risks, "[t]he syndrome 'I am not a terror risk' certainly pre-
vails,""0 5 thus countering incentives for a corporation to purchase terrorism
insurance.
Several other countries are considering implementing some form of ter-
rorism insurance. The Marine and Fire Insurance Association of Japan con-
tinues to hold discussions concerning the set-up of a "terrorism risk pool,"
and plans to implement one should the demand come from corporate cus-
tomers."° Italy's National Association of Insurance Companies ("ANIA")
submitted a proposal to set up a government-backed reinsurance pool to
cover acts of terrorism and natural catastrophes.' ° Singapore's insurance in-
dustry is seeking financial coverage from its government to help it provide
commercial terrorism insurance." 8 Even risk managers in Canada, who per-
197. Allianz Plans to Set Up Terrorism Insurance Unit, FN. TvMEs (London), Feb. 21,
2002, at 1.
198. Press Release, Special Risk Insurance and Reinsurance Luxembourg S.A., (Apr. 4,
2002), available at www.scor.fr/pdf/SRIR-ik.pdf (on file with California Western Law Re-
view/International Law Journal). The corporate shareholders include Zurich Financial Ser-
vices, XL Capital Ltd., Swiss Re, Hannover Re, Allianz and Scor. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Tony Major, Insurance Attempt to Meet Growing Demand for Policies Since Sep-
tember 11, FIN. TIMEs (London), Apr. 5, 2002, at 25.
202. Id.
203. Sarah Veysey, Terrorism Insurer Closing Its Doors, Bus. INs., Mar. 13, 2003,
available at www.businessinsurance.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?newsld=2108&print=Y.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Kunio Ishihara, The Statement of the Chairman of the Marine and Fire Insurance
Association of Japan (Sept. 19, 2002, Tokyo) (translation), available at
http://www.sonpo.or.jp/english/topics/state_20020919e.html.
207. Alfonso Desiata, President's Report to the Annual Assembly (June 13, 2002, Rome)
(translation by author), available at http://www.ania.it/search.html (search "assicurazione de
terrorismo," document title "Relazione Annuale del Presidente Alfonso Desiata").
208. Singapore Insurers Seek Government Help to Provide Commercial Terrorism
Cover, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA, Mar. 31, 2003.
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ceive terrorism risks in their country to be much lower than risks in the
United States, recognize some value in terrorism insurance.2" Though it is
not currently a big issue, terrorism insurance is either unavailable for large
buildings or available only at extremely expensive premiums."' Thus, Can-
ada is also "moving in the same direction as the United States" in regards to
terrorism insurance."' In brief, there is demonstrated international concern
regarding the availability of terrorism insurance.
III. PROPOSAL TO SUPPORT INSURING CORPORATE
INTERESTS AGAINST TERRORISM
In a globalized world, where political leaders stress the importance of
continued trade and globalization to combat terrorism, terrorism insurance is
needed to protect business interests and promote the channels of globaliza-
tion. Considering the domestic and international state-backed efforts to pro-
vide terrorism insurance, the issue is whether a concerted, global effort will
be more efficacious in providing terrorism insurance to MNCs rather than
several individual programs.
A. TRIA Analyzed
1. Current Status of Terrorism Insurance in the U.S.
In the U.S., despite the availability of terrorism insurance, not many
corporations have actually purchased it. 2 A survey by the Council of Insur-
ance Agents and Brokers concluded that less than ten percent of small busi-
nesses have purchased it, while about twenty percent of medium size busi-
nesses have opted for the coverage. 3 Large businesses are purchasing it, but
are searching for other solutions given the high cost and limited coverage.2 4
Even though there was an increase in sales for terrorism insurance prior to
the invasion of Iraq, most businesses are not purchasing it.2" In the event of
another terrorist attack, corporations may simply expect federal assistance
209. Thomas G. Dolan, Terrorism Insurance: Risk Managers Wrestle with Terrorism
Insurance Options, 27 NAT'L APARTMENT ASS'N UNITS 34, Apr. 1, 2003, at 34.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Joseph B. Treaster, Insurance For Terrorism Still a Rarity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
2003, at C 1.
213. Christine Dugas, Many Firms Shun Federal Terrorism Insurance, USA TODAY,
Apr. 2, 2003, at 6B.
214. Id. Though a survey of large businesses have reported that the coverage costs an
additional 24% of their overall premiums, some brokers note that some clients were charged
81-100% of their overall premiums. Meg Green, A Glass Half Full, 104 BEST'S REV. 50
(Sept. 1, 2003).
215. Jackie Spinner, War Exemption Limits Terrorism Insurance, WASH. POST, Apr. 3,
2003, at El.
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just as they did following the September 1 1" attacks." 6 Though TRIA is a
worthy effort to respond to corporate and insurance industry's needs con-
cerning terrorism coverage, it is limited in some applications.
a. Limited Definition of Terrorism
The definition of terrorism is limited to acts performed on behalf of for-
eign interests."7 This may raise ambiguities where a U.S. citizen commits a
terrorist act, and it is difficult to discern whether the act was executed on be-
half of a foreign interest. The definition also excludes acts of domestic ter-
rorism, such as the Oklahoma City bombing. Finally, the definition is too
narrow because the Secretary of Treasury's determination of a terrorist act is
not subject to judicial review." 8 This grants great discretionary authority to
the Secretary. In the event of litigation concerning the definition of a terror-
ist act, the non-availability of judicial review could raise some constitutional
concerns, 2 9 which may result in lengthy and costly litigation.
b. Exclusions from Coverage
TRIA excludes too many events to adequately serve the terrorism insur-
ance needs of businesses. The war-time exclusion is unclear because it does
not clarify whether an event occurring during a U.S. Congress-declared war,
but unrelated to the war, will be covered. TRIA does not require coverage
for catastrophes caused by weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear,
chemical and biological agents. 22 ' Given the possibility of an anthrax or other
biological attack, TRIA simply does not cover enough potential types, of ter-
rorism.
c. Litigation
The non-immunity provision for corporations in civil lawsuits deters in-
terested companies from purchasing terrorism insurance. In addition to busi-
ness concerns, the provision raises an international issue. Because victims of
terrorism will be able to sue corporations for damages, including foreign
corporations, it may be viewed by some countries as an intrusion of sover-
216. Treaster, supra note 212.
217. TRIA § 102(1).
218. Id. § 102(l)(C).
219. The provision stating the Secretary of Treasury's determination of a terrorist act is
not subject to judicial review may raise two Constitutional issues: 1) It is possibly an uncon-
stitutional delegation of judicial power to the Executive branch for final determination of an
act of terrorism; and 2) there is potential the Secretary's determination of a terrorist act will
not be supported by the Constitution.
220. Dugas, supra note 213.
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eignty."2  This, in turn, may lead to similar laws and lawsuits being rendered
against the U.S. government,2. or U.S.-based MNCs.
d. What U.S. Corporations Are Doing for Terrorism Insurance
The novelty of terrorism insurance, its high cost and numerous uncer-
tainties have deterred businesses from purchasing it. Many businesses feel
TRIA does not adequately respond to the raised concerns. 3 As a result,
large businesses have started to purchase stand-alone coverage, which is
more expensive, but better responds to policyholders' needs.2 Some com-
panies are contemplating forming a mutual insurance company to cater poli-
cies to their needs and allow for more manageable costs.225
2. Role of TRIA in the International Terrorism Insurance Market
Though one of the stated purposes of TRIA is to promote the U.S. econ-
omy's role in a globalized world and continue pursuing economic success
through U.S. exports, international trade and globalization, it does not ad-
dress the needs of MNCs who require insurance abroad.2 Companies must
purchase a separate terrorism policy to cover acts of terrorism occurring in
international locations. Because these policies will not be backed by TRIA, a
MNC may have difficulty in locating an insurer who is willing to insure for
such a risk, and will likely pay high-priced premiums because of the lack of
government backing. In addition, having different insurers for various busi-
ness aspects may prove to be burdensome and unduly expensive.
Take, for example, a U.S. headquartered technology corporation with
production facilities in Indonesia and Mexico, subsidiaries in France and
221. See Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Terrorism Insurance Act Provides for Civil Causes of Act,
19 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 71 (2003). Currently, the only exception to foreign sovereign
immunity the U.S. may utilize when suing a foreign state is found in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. It states that an action for money damages may be brought against a nation if
personal injury or death is caused by "torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [or] hos-
tage taking... if the foreign state is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism." 28 U.S.C.
§1605(a)(7) (2003). The countries currently designated as state sponsors of terrorism are
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Sudan and Syria. 15 C.F.R. 740 (Supp. 2003).
222. Zagaris, supra note 221.
223. See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
224. Dugas, supra note 213, at 6B.
225. Id.
226. An insurance expert encourages captives domiciled outside the U.S., such as a U.S.
subsidiary, to review TRIA and inform the Secretary of Treasury and the NAIC of the situa-
tion so that they may consider applying TRIA to other captives. Michael Mead, Captives, the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, and the Market (Jan. 2003) at www.irmi.com/expert/ arti-
cles/MeadOO5.asp. International Risk Management Institute is a U.S. research and publishing
company working in insurance and risk management. A captive is a subsidiary that a com-
pany establishes for the sole purpose of insuring the parent company's risk. Boran, supra note
154, at 536. Because TRIA applies to domestic captives, many large companies are either
creating or reorganizing existing captives to insure terrorism risks. Green, supra note 214.
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Germany and a major customer in Israel. The corporation would have to
purchase stand-alone terrorism insurance to insure its production facilities in
Indonesia and Mexico, who currently have no state-backed terrorism insur-
ance programs. In France and Germany, it may participate in GAREAT and
Extremus, both providing different definitions for terrorist acts, various
scales for premiums and differing scopes of coverage. When visiting its
main customer in Israel, the MNC would have to purchase Israeli insurance
for foreign travelers, since most of the state-backed policies do not offer
casualty insurance for events occurring outside of their borders. How is in-
ternational business and trade, which can combat terrorism, to be pursued
when insuring terrorism risks requires either costly stand-alone terrorism in-
surance or burdensome efforts to purchase state-backed coverage in each
country of business?2.7
B. The Consequences of Not Having A Multilateral Response to the Need for
Terrorism Insurance
The number of MNCs evidences the globalized and interdependent na-
ture of individual national economies.22 Currently, there are over 65,000
MNCs that maintain about 850,000 foreign affiliates.2' A dichotomy exists
because there is a keen interest to have terrorism insurance available, yet
consumer purchases remain low. Either these MNCs do not envision them-
selves as being in danger of terrorism attacks, or the coverage is too costly.
One way to address the dichotomy is to create a multilateral effort to
provide terrorism insurance. Especially during economic declines, it is bur-
densome for MNCs to purchase separate policies for each office and subsidi-
ary. Buying terrorism insurance is not cost-effective if each host country has
a unilateral policy that demands various premiums for diverse definitional
acts of terrorism. 3°
227. MNCs at risk for terrorism attacks include those going to Iraq to help rebuild the
country's infrastructure. As of October 29, 2003, thirteen contracts and six grants have been
awarded to companies to help reconstruct Iraq's financial, agricultural, transportation, educa-
tion, and health systems, and the U.S. government is currently seeking to award more con-
tracts. See Iraq Reconstruction Task Force, Awarded Contracts & Grants, at
http://www.export.gov/iraq/contracts/index.html (Nov. 14, 2003). However, MNCs operating
anywhere are at risk due to the reorganization of AI-Qaeda. David Johnston & Don Van
Natta, Jr., Aftereffects: Terrorist Threat, U.S. Officials See Signs of a Revived Al-Qaeda, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 2003, at Al.
228. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Glob-
alization, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 705, 720-21 (2002).
229. Thomas Andersson & Georgina Schemberg, Transnational Corporations and Ex-
port Competitiveness, UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2002, available at
http://www.iked.org/pdf/UNCTAD.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2003).
230. See Thomas A. Player, Jr. et al., A Global Definition of Terrorism 6 (June 15,
2002), at http://mmlaw.com/articles/article-152.pdf (advocating a global definition of terror-
ism because a "patchwork of definitions" in a series of unilateral state-backed insurance
schemes could greatly increase confusion for MNCs in conducting risk management and
cause lapses in coverage between primary insurers and the state-backed programs).
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Initially, terrorism insurance initiatives in the U.K., Israel, Spain and
South Africa were created to address particular threats; now they must adjust
their programs to account for the heightened terrorist threats posed by the
events of September 1 1 h.T As evidenced by the several unilateral measures
that were in place prior to September 1 1", terrorism was primarily a national
concern. Now, terrorism has an international dimension.232 U.S. leaders have
explicitly stated international business and trade is integral to fighting a war
on terrorism."' If terrorism insurance aids MNCs in these endeavors, then it
should be more cost-effective and will properly respond to MNC's needs.
Private companies must play the primary role in protecting their assets
against terrorist attacks."3 In order to prevent burdensome government regu-
lations aimed at helping companies protect their assets, the government
could play a minimal role and instead allow insurance companies to require
additional precautionary measures.235 Insurers could give financial incentives
to those who take more precautions.236
For MNCs, coverage that applies at an international level will be most
cost efficient and productive. In the interests of promoting business and cre-
ating a feasible mechanism to insure international terrorism risks, an interna-
tional private-public endeavor should be pursued. For example, a private in-
ternational mutual insurance group, backed by an organization such as the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), 237
could be effective. The international mutual insurance group could serve as
the primary insurer for the MNCs. The primary insurer could then spread the
risk to various reinsurers. Finally, countries interested in protecting their
MNCs could act as insurers of last resort. An international umbrella organi-
zation could facilitate the coverage, where a country agrees to provide the
231. Bolger, supra note 155.
232. September 1 I was not the first terrorist attack aimed at Americans to result in the
killing of many foreigners. On January 8, 1999, 224 people, including Americans, Kenyans
and Tanzanians, were killed in a terrorist bombing on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. See IHEKWOABA D. ONWUDIWE, THE GLOBALIZATION OF
TERRORisM 123 (2001).
233. See Zoellick, supra note 3, at 11.
234. Dana H. Allin et al., The Democratic Party and Foreign Policy, 20 WORLD POL'Y J.
7 (Spring 2003), at http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03- l/allin.html.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. OECD discussed the problems associated with the decreased availability and af-
fordability of terrorism insurance and is open to suggestions on how to cover terrorism risks
and ."assess the respective roles of the insurance industry, financial markets and govern-
ments... [for terrorism] risks."' Player et al., supra note 230, at 4 n. 12. Currently, the OECD
ministers have mandated the OECD Insurance Committee to develop policy analysis and for-
mulate suggestions for defining terrorism risks and considering the respective roles the insur-
ance industry, financial markets and governments could play in covering terrorism risks. An
initial paper discussing the topics is due to come out at the end of 2003, and should be final-
ized in 2004. Email Correspondence with C,6cile Vignial, OECD Principal Administrator of
Financial Affairs Division (on file with California Western Law Review/International Law
Journal).
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international organization with a certain percentage of coverage for partici-
pating MNCs in the event of a terrorist attack. The percentage of coverage
could vary according to the percentage of participating INCs from the par-
ticipating country. In effect, the resources that are to be used for several uni-
lateral state-backed insurance programs can be effectively applied to an in-
ternational private-public insurance pool.
CONCLUSION
Because terrorism has used the tools of globalization to help carry out
its objectives, it follows that unilateral action against terrorism is insuffi-
cient, and a multinational response is more appropriate. 3 On September 28,
2001, the United Nations passed a Security Council Resolution that de-
nounced terrorism and proposed multilateral actions.239 The Resolution
strongly urges nations to combat terrorism and authorizes the use of force to
do so.2" If terrorism is an international concern whose occurrences are not
limited by national borders, then a multilateral response is necessary to
maintain the national security of the international community.""
There are currently twelve international treaties that deal with interna-
tional terrorism.4 The European Union ("EU") has engaged in multilateral
actions, including increased law enforcement and judicial cooperation, to
combat terrorism.2 3 The EU's counter-terrorism efforts have been greatly fa-
cilitated by its legal framework." Similarly, pursuing an international coali-
tion to insure against terrorism, under an established legal framework such
as the OECD, may be the most efficient way to provide terrorism insurance
that will protect MNCs that pursue international business and trade.
If MNCs either pull out of international business and trade operations or
forego an opportunity to pursue such interests, only terrorists will result as
the victors. Following the post-September 1 1' terrorist attacks on Western
targets in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, foreign policy advisor to Crown Prince Ab-
dullah, Adel al-Jubeir, urged American companies to refuse any contempla-
238. Jay M. Vogelson, Multinational Approaches to Eradicating International Terror-
ism, 36 INT'L LAW. 67, 69 (2002). Cf JEFFREY F. ADDICOTr, WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR
199 (2003) (submitting that a key component of the war on terror is a strong U.S. leadership
role, and includes the deployment of U.S. troops whose presence in a region both deters ag-
gression and has the ability to defeat any challenges that arise).
239. Vogelson, supra note 238, at 70.
240. Id.
241. Barry Kellman, An Introduction to Terrorism and Business, 12 DEPAuL Bus. L.J.
21, 27 (1999/2000). Note, however, that terrorists view international law as Western-imposed
norms that have no authority when dealing with infidels or those of another class, people or
religion. WALTER LACQUER, THE NEW TERRORISM 276 (1999).
242. MARJORIE A. BROWNE, Focus ON TERRORISM 169 (Edward V. Linden ed., Nova
Science Publishers, Inc. 2002).
243. Bruce Zagaris, EU Initiates New Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, 17 No. 11 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 459 (2001).
244. Id.
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tion of withdrawing their businesses from Saudi Arabia because such an act
would "amount to 'a victory for the terrorists.""'45 In an industry based on
uncertainty and risk, a multilateral effort, as opposed to disparate unilateral
efforts, can provide MNCs with the certainty and consistency they require to
be successful. Fighting antiglobalization is precisely the way to combat ter-
rorism because globalization battles the economic disparity that feeds terror-
ism. Helping MNCs protect the channels of globalization by providing them
with effective international insurance coverage will enable them to promote
international business and trade. By promoting such economic prosperity,
MNCs will emerge the victors, rather than the victims, of terrorism.
Elizabeth Pietanza"
245. Douglas Jehl, Aftereffects: Riyadh Attacks, N.Y. TIMEs, May 17, 2003, at A9.J.D. candidate, April 2004, California Western School of Law; B.A. Philosophy,
Villanova University, May 1996. Thank you to Professor Gloria L. Sandrino for providing
comments and encouragement in drafting this article. I am gracious to Joseph, Flora, and all
my family for sharing their strength with me, and especially thank Al for his creativity and
patience.
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